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RAIDING ISLAM: SEARCHES THAT TARGET
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
John G. Doug/asst
INTRODUCTION

On the morning of March 20, 2002, while television cameras
recorded the events for the evening news, dozens of federal agents
entered and searched the offices of several Islamic educational and
religious organizations in Northern Virginia. 1 The agents were
searching, it appears, for evidence that those organizations contributed
money to international groups known to have sponsored terrorist acts.
By most public accounts, the targeted institutions were regarded as
moderate and progressive voices in American Islam. 2 For that reason,
the searches sent shock waves through the American Muslim
community. Muslims who had supported the Administration's domestic
war on terrorism began to wonder out loud: If religious institutions like
these are suspect in the eyes of the government, then what Islamic
organization is not? Is this a war on terrorism, or a war on Islam?
In response to protests from a variety of American Muslim
organizations, the government was quick to point out that the searches
were authorized by warrants issued by a federal magistrate. 3 But as
months have passed with little indication that the searches produced
t Professor of Law, University of Richmond. I wish to express thanks to my colleague,
Azizah al-Hibri, for the invitation to contribute to this symposium and to Ron Bacigal and
Jonathan Stubbs for their helpful comments. I am indebted to Cassie Craze for her exceptional
research assistance, and to the University of Richmond School of Law for providing the research
grant that made this project possible.
1. This symposium includes first-hand accounts of the searches from some who were
present. See pp. 105, supra. For news accounts, see Tom Jackman, N. Va. Sites Raided in Probe
of Terrorism; Federal Agencies Seek Information on Funds, Wash. Post Bl (Mar. 21, 2002); and
Judith Miller, A Nation Challenged: The Money Trail; U.S. Raids Continue. Prompting Protests,
N.Y. Times Al3 (Mar. 22, 2002).
2. John Mintz & Tom Jackman, Finances Prompted Raids on Muslims; U.S. Suspected
Terrorism Ties to N. Va. For Years, Wash. Post Al (Mar. 24, 2002); and Nancy Dunne, U.S.
Muslims See their American Dreams Die, Fin. Times (London) IO (Mar. 28, 2002). ("respected
Islamic institutions").
3. The Washington Post quoted United States Attorney, Paul McNulty, as saying, "A search
warrant is issued only after a magistrate judge ascertains that probable cause exists that a crime
was committed. This case followed that procedure." See Brooke A. Masters, Va. Muslim Groups
Want Property Back, Wash. Post A9 (May 3, 2002).
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evidence of any crime, questions about the government's choice of
targets and tactics continue to trouble many observers. Why did the
government choose the tactic of multiple, coordinated and well
publicized searches rather than the simpler, quieter alternative of a
subpoena? Before searching religious institutions, did government
agents and attorneys consider the harm that would come to reputable
religious institutions from the searches? If so, did government officials
conclude that other factors-like the risk that subpoenaed records might
be destroyed-outweighed the potential harm to religious expression?
Or does the government now regard the chilling of religious expression
by "suspect" organizations to be a legitimate goal of law enforcement in
combating terrorism?
Despite the importance of these questions to the American Muslim
community in particular, and to the community of faith-based
organizations more generally, solid answers are hard to find. 4 In this
brief essay, I will not attempt to unravel the bits and pieces of publicly
available data that might answer these questions as a matter of fact.
Instead, I will try to put the searches in legal context by addressing two
basic questions. First, how does our law account for the damage that
may result from a search warrant where the search by itself may stifle
religious expression? Second, does that law make sense in light of the
law enforcement tactics used, and the religious interests at stake, in the
domestic war against terrorism?
I.

OPERATION GREENQUEST AND ITS FALLOUT

A. The Searches-On March 20 and 21, 2002, federal agents
executed search warrants on sixteen locations in the Northern Virginia
suburbs of Washington, D.C. The raids targeted the offices of Islamic
charitable and educational institutions, and the homes of individual
Muslims who worked in those institutions. Despite the fact that
affidavits supporting the search warrants were sealed by court order,
government sources quickly informed the press that the searches were
part of "Operation Green Quest," a U.S. Customs Service initiative
4. Aff. (Redacted) in Support of Application for Search Warrant (October 2003), In the
Matter of Searches Involving 555 Grove Street, Herndon, Virginia, and Related Locations, Misc.
No. 02-114-MG (E.D. Va.). The affidavit supporting the search warrants was sealed at the
government's request. See id. at 8,, 10. After eighteen months, a redacted version was unsealed.
Despite its unusual length-almost one hundred pages-the redacted affidavit fails to draw any
clear connection between the Northern Virginia institutions and any terrorist organization.
Indeed, the affidavit candidly admits that the trail of funds disbursed outside the United States
"cannot practically be followed." Id. Instead, much of the affidavit aims to show that the targeted
institutions may have violated IRS reporting requirements for tax-exempt charitable institutions.
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designed to stop the flow of money to terrorist groups. 5 Later statements
by Customs officials suggest that the Northern Virginia raids were by far
the largest initiative undertaken by Operation Green Quest in the year
following the September 11 terrorist attacks. 6
The search warrants were broadly framed.
In addition to
authorizing seizure of financial records, the warrants called for seizure
of all computers as well. 7 Ranging even further, the warrants authorized
seizure of documents, pamphlets, leaflets, booklets, audio and
videotapes that related to any "individual or entity designated as a
terrorist" under federal law. 8 In effect, therefore, the warrants
authorized seizure of everything from the daily newspaper to religious
treatises decrying terrorism. Over the course of two days, the agents
seized about five hundred boxes of papers and eighty computers. 9
Among the documents seized by federal agents were library books,
pamphlets on religious education and scholarly manuscripts awaiting
publication. 10 In some instances, it appears, documents written in
Arabic were seized by agents who could not speak or read the
language. 11
Whether the Customs agents hit any real targets in their search for
terrorist funding remains to be seen. Within days of the searches,
Government sources told the press that some of the seized materials had

5. See Jackman, supra n. l, at B 1. Over the months after the raids, the press reported a wide
range of details about the investigation, attributing most of them to government sources.
According to those reports, the probe had begun in 1996 as an investigation of anti-Israeli activists
in Florida. The government had traced contributions from a Northern Virginia group, identified as
the SAAR Foundation, to the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a now defunct research
group led by University of South Florida professor Sarni Al-Arian. See Mintz & Jackman, supra
n. 2, at Al. WISE was closed down when the State Department designated it as a funding
organization for militant Palestinian groups, including Hamas. See Jerry Seper, Revived Probe
Eyes 80 Charities' Ties to Terrorism, The Wash. Times A3 (Apr. 9, 2002). Al Arian was indicted
in February 2003 for alleged support of Palestinian terrorists. See Elaine Silvestrini, Al-Arian
Won't Be Set Free on Bail, Tampa Trib. (Apr. 11, 2003).
6. Shortly after the Northern Virginia raids, Customs officials stated that Operation Green
Quest was responsible for twenty-one searches, twelve arrests and four indictments. See Dunne,
supra n. 2, at 10. The March 14, 2002 searches therefore accounted for about two-thirds of Green
Quest search activity as of that time. In October 2002, government officials called the Northern
Virginia investigation "one of the highest priorities of Operation Green Quest." Douglas Farah &
John Mintz, U.S. Trails Va. Muslim Money, Ties, Wash. Post Al (Oct. 7, 2002).
7. See Br. Amicus Curiae of the Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Va. Inc., In Support of Mot.
for Return of Prop. and to Unseal the Search Warrant Aff. at 3, In the Matter of the Search of 750
A Miller Drive, et al. No. 02-MG-122 (E.D. Va.) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
8. Id.
9. See Brooke A. Masters, U.S. Magistrate Denies Muslim Groups' Request, Wash. Post
Al3 (May 4, 2002).
10. ACLU Brief, supra n. 7, at 3; and Masters, supra n. 3, at A9.
11. ACLU Brief, supra n. 7, at 3.
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provided "substantial leads." 12 But today, approaching two years later,
none of the people or institutions searched in March 2002 has been
charged with any crime. None of their financial assets has been frozen
or seized.
B. Damage in the Wake of the Searches-While the efficacy of the
raids is known only to government insiders, the damage resulting from
the raids is easier to see. On one level, the damage was very personal,
and quite immediate. Elsewhere in this Symposium, several American
Muslim women offer their first-hand accounts of the searches. They
speak of fear at seeing armed strangers burst into their workplaces,
humiliation at being handcuffed and monitored within their own homes,
and frustration at the futility of their efforts to learn why it all happened.
For the targeted religious institutions, the most obvious and
immediate harm was the disruption of the ongoing business of teaching,
learning, writing and publishing. For a period of months, several of the
targeted institutions were virtually shut down because the seizure of
their computers deprived them of everything from student academic
records to payroll information. 13 Enrollments dropped. Employees were
laid off. 14 Publications, presentations and conferences were delayed or
cancelled. The long-term effects from the March 2002 searches are
harder to calculate, though perhaps even more significant. For the
targeted institutions themselves, the well-publicized raids are likely to
chill financial support, not to mention future enrollments and
participation in public programs.
Ripple effects from the searches likely will extend beyond the
specific institutions raided in March 2002, especially because those
institutions and their leaders were widely regarded as progressive voices
in American Islam. One, the Graduate School of Islamic and Social
Sciences, has been the principal trainer of Muslim imams who serve as
chaplains in the U.S. military. 15 Another, the Fiqh Council of North
America, is a council of moderate Islamic clerics who had been
denounced by radicals for issuing a ruling allowing Muslims to fight in
the American armed forces in Afghanistan. 16 When the government
targets institutions like these for the kind of treatment normally reserved
12. Dunne, supra n. 2, at l 0.
13. See Masters, supra n. 3, at A9.
14. See Paul Bradley, Muslims Feel Targeted; Raids, Other Actions Cited at Fairfax Meeting,
Richmond Times-Dispatch BS (Sept. 29, 2002).
15. See Jackman, supra n. 1, at B 1.
16. See Farah & Mintz, supra n. 6, at Al; and Phillip Kurata, U.S. Islamic Leaders Issue
Fatwa on U.S. Muslim Soldiers Fighting Terrorists (U.S. Dept. St. Info. Programs Oct. 16, 2001)
<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ 01101611.htm> (accessed Jan. 20, 2004).
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for drug dealers and thieves, the not-so-subtle message to the broader
community of American Muslims is hard to avoid: Be careful whom you
trust with your money, your time, your thoughts and your faith. 17
C. The Government's Choice of Tactics-One of the most
troubling aspects of the March 2002 searches is that the government
chose to use search warrants at all, rather than to employ tactics that
would limit collateral damage to religious institutions.
In an
investigation targeting financial transactions, the government has other
means for obtaining the records necessary to trace money and identify
its sources. The simplest, of course, is just to ask for the information.
Another is to subpoena it. In the vast run of financial investigations, the
government obtains most of its information through these means rather
than through search warrants.
The reasons that financial investigators typically choose subpoenas
rather than resorting to search warrants are well known. First, search
warrants are more costly and more difficult to obtain than subpoenas.
Issuing a subpoena is a simple, clerical task. Obtaining a search
warrant, at least in a complex financial investigation in the federal
system, typically involves days of preparation by agents and
prosecutors, drafting oflengthy affidavits to show probable cause for the
search, and the approval of a federal magistrate. 18
Second, search warrants are more difficult to execute.
A
subpoenaed party does his own searching and hands over the
subpoenaed records. To execute a search warrant, agents must assemble
a team, enter a premises, and spend hours or days plowing through
extensive records to find what they are seeking. Where the records are
stored on computers, they must undertake the difficult task of
circumventing passwords and other security measures to access the
stored data without changing or destroying it in the process. Where
many of the documents are in a language unknown to most federal
agents-Arabic in this case-translators must read the documents before
the agents can know what to seize.
Third, search warrants are dangerous. Even in a financial
investigation, the unexpected entry of armed strangers into a home or
17. In protesting the raids, the Council on American-Islamic Relations said that targeting
"respected Islamic institutions sends a hostile and chilling message to the American Muslim
community and contradicts President Bush's repeated assertions that the war against terrorism is
not a conflict with Islam." Dunne, supra n. 2, at 10.
18. In describing these investigative techniques, I write primarily from personal experience as
a federal prosecutor. For a detailed analysis of the roles of federal prosecutors and agents during
complex investigations, see Daniel Richman, Federal Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and
their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (2002).
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business is a tricky proposition. By contrast, reports of physical injury
in serving a subpoena are rare.
Fourth, in comparison to searches, subpoenas minimize invasion of
privacy and disruption of ordinary business. As the March 2002
searches demonstrate, a search for documentary evidence requires
agents to review hundreds or thousands of pages in order to identify the
ones that are subject to seizure. By comparison, a subpoena directs the
recipient to find the relevant documents within its own records.
Typically, a subpoenaed party (or its attorneys) can accomplish that
process with no disruption to ongoing business and without inviting
outsiders to rifle through confidential records.
Finally, a subpoena poses less risk of damage to the reputation of
the recipient. Banks, telephone companies, utilities and other businesses
receive subpoenas in criminal investigations as a matter of routine. Both
by design and by law, the process is secret. By contrast, the execution
of a search warrant is a far more dramatic event, and one more likely to
stigmatize those who are searched. 19
Of course, there are valid reasons why the government may choose
to use search warrants, rather than subpoenas, despite the increased
costs, risks, disruption and stigma associated with a warrant. The
principal reason is that the recipient of a subpoena has the opportunity to
destroy or hide the evidence. In large measure, when prosecutors and
investigators rely on subpoenas, they also rely on the good faith of the
subpoenaed persons and entities, or their lawyers. In choosing whether
to use search warrants or subpoenas, therefore, law enforcement officials
typically undertake a cost-benefit analysis. They weigh the many costs
and disadvantages of a search warrant against the risks that evidence
will be hidden or destroyed. This cost-benefit calculus accounts for the
fact that search warrants typically are the tactic of choice in the
investigation of drug dealing and violent crime, while subpoenas
typically are preferred in financial investigations. 20
19. These substantial differences between subpoenas and other more coercive forms of
government investigation are accounted for in constitutional law. There is an immense body of
law regulating searches and arrests under the Fourth Amendment. By contrast, the Court has held
that a subpoena for testimony is not even a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, see U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973), and Fourth Amendment regulation of
subpoenas is minimal, see U.S. v. R Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (holding that
subpoena does not violate 4th Amendment where there is any reasonable possibility that
subpoenaed materials will be relevant to investigation).
20. This difference may have been more pronounced a decade ago than it is today. While
subpoenas remain the tool of choice in financial investigations, prosecutors are employing search
warrants with increasing frequency in white-collar investigations. See Julie R. O'Sullivan,
Federal White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials 10 (West Group 2001).
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There is another, more problematic reason why the government
may choose to use search warrants rather than subpoenas: search
warrants send a message. Because search warrants normally are
reserved for those about to be charged with crime, a search often sends a
public message that the subjects of the search are viewed as criminals by
the government.21 And that message is amplified when government
sources alert the media-as they apparently did in March 2002-to
ensure that the televised image of armed agents seizing evidence by
force appears on the evening news. In many cases, that kind of public
display may be of little consequence, because it is followed in short
order by other events open to public scrutiny: arrests, criminal charges,
and a public trial. In such cases, the government is put to its proof and
the suspect has a chance to defend his reputation. In such cases, the
public aspects of searches, arrests and trials may serve the legitimate
interest of deterrence. People see justice being done.
The aftermath of the very public March 2002 searches, however,
followed a different and more troubling pattern. The factual basis for
the searches remained officially secret for over a year, hidden in
affidavits that were sealed at the government's request. 22 At the same
time, unnamed government "sources" made sure that the government's
message found its way into the newspapers through selective statements
about Operation Green Quest and its aims. 23 As a practical matter, the
government has publicly identified the targeted religious organizations
as aiders and abettors to terrorism, while avoiding any responsibility for
proving the charge. 24

21. "The dramatic character of a sudden search may cause an entirely unjustified injury to the
reputation of the persons searched." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 580 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. In a particularly odd twist, a principal "confidential" source for the sealed affidavit may
well have thrust herself and her information into the public eye. About a year after the raids, a
book was published by an "anonymous" author who claimed to have worked extensively with
Green Quest agents to develop probable cause for the warrants. Anonymous, The Terrorist
Hunter 301-330 (Ecco 2003). The "anonymous" author appeared on the CBS News show, Sixty
Minutes, on May 4, 2003, without using her name or showing her face. Predictably, her nameRita Katz-was quickly and widely disclosed. In short order, she was sued for libel by some of
those targeted in the March 2002 raids. Just before Katz' appearance on Sixty Minutes, the
government reversed its position and asked that portions of the affidavit be unsealed.
23. See supra nn. 5 & 6.
24. "It's a smearing," commented Washington D.C. attorney Nancy Luque, who represents
many of the targeted institutions. Farah & Mintz, supra n. 6, at Al.
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WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: "LAWFUL" SEARCHESTHATCHILL
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION

From a constitutional perspective, the March 2002 searches present
an apparent clash between the Fourth Amendment world of search and
seizure and the First Amendment world of religious freedom. On the
one hand, the government claims that its tactics were lawful. After all,
the searches were authorized by warrants issued by a neutral magistrate
who found probable cause to believe that there was evidence of crime in
the places that were searched.25 On the other hand, the searches caused
substantial damage to religious organizations that have never been
charged with a crime. Activities traditionally protected by the First
Amendment-religious teaching and publication-have been disrupted.
Financial support for religious institutions has been threatened. Even
more troubling, that kind of fallout was easily predictable and-at least
for some government decision makers-may even have been an
intended consequence of the raids. 26 In sum, if probable cause is the
only standard by which we measure the legality of searches aimed at
religious institutions, then the Fourth Amendment can allow searches
and seizures that are predictably destructive to the First Amendment
interests of those institutions. In a nation committed to religious liberty,
that doesn't sound right.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly considered this clash of
constitutional doctrines in a case involving the search of religious
institutions. 27 After all, police seldom search for evidence of crime in
churches. To sort out these First and Fourth Amendment concerns,
therefore, we must tum to a closely analogous setting: the search of a
newspaper office. The Court's opinion in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily 8
25. See supra n. 3, and accompanying text.
26. In the post-9/11 environment, it is simply implausible that the government officials who
planned the March 2002 raids failed to recognize in advance that the event would be highly
publicized and highly damaging to the business and reputation of the targeted institutions. Indeed,
the rapidity and number of statements to the press from "government sources" after the raids
suggest a calculated government effort to publicize the alleged connection between those
institutions and terrorists. It is hard to escape the conclusion that one purpose of the massive,
well-publicized searches was simply to disrupt the operations of the targeted groups. In a moment
of-perhaps excessive-candor, one government source told a reporter that, even if the searches
did not lead to prosecutions, they would serve the purpose of disrupting the flow of money to
terrorists. See Mintz & Jackman, supra n. 2, at A 1.
27. There are few reported cases from lower federal courts addressing searches of religious
institutions. See e.g. Presbyterian Church v. U.S., 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing
standing of a church to raise First and Fourth Amendment claims). The government's
investigation of the "church" of Scientology produced a few. See e.g. U.S. v. Heldt, 668 F.2d
1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
28. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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may offer the best frame of reference for considering the constitutional
issues at stake in the March 2002 searches.
In April 1971, at the height of protests against the Vietnam War, a
large group of students occupied the offices of Stanford University
Hospital. 29 When police arrived, violence broke out and nine police
officers were injured. Two days later, the Staeford Daily student
newspaper carried accounts of the incident, along with- photographs.
The news story and published photos indicated that the photographer
had been in position to take other photographs that might identify those
who assaulted the police. 30 The District Attorney obtained search
warrants authorizing police to enter and search the newspaper offices for
negatives and photographs depicting the assaults. The searches
uncovered nothing other than the already-published photos. Weeks
later, the Stanford Daily filed a civil suit, alleging that police violated
the newspaper's First and Fourth Amendment rights. 31
There was no question that the warrants had been issued by a
neutral magistrate, and were based upon probable cause to believe that
the newspaper offices might contain photographic evidence of the
assaults. But the Daily argued that the searches were nonetheless
unlawful, for three reasons.
(1) Searches Directed at "Innocent" Parties-The Daily was not
suspected of any crime. It was an innocent third party that happened to
possess evidence of a crime committed by someone else. Under those
circumstances, the newspaper argued, it should not have to endure the
inconvenience, disruption and invasion of privacy that come from an
unannounced search. 32
The Court rejected the argument. As a general rule, the Court
found, the Fourth Amendment requires no special showing in order to
justify the search of property occupied by an innocent party. The Fourth
Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches," and provides that "no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."33 Reading those two
clauses together, the Zurcher Court wrote
The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of
the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the specific "things" to be searched for and

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id. at 550.
See id. at 551.
See id. at 552.
See id. at 553-554.
U.S. Const. amend. N.

104

JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION

[Vol. XIX

seized are located on the property to which entry is sought. 34
"Search warrants," the Court noted, "are not directed at persons; they
authorize the search of 'place[s]' and the seizure of 'things."'35 As a
constitutional matter, therefore, it is irrelevant whether the owner or
occupant of the place to be searched is himself suspected of any crime.
(2) Search Warrants where Subpoenas May Suffice-Second, the
newspaper argued that the search was not necessary. Before authorizing
the search of property occupied by an innocent party, the Stanford Daily
asserted, a magistrate must find probable cause to believe that police
cannot obtain the evidence simply by requesting it or by subpoenaing
it. 36 In other words, a search directed at an innocent third party is
"unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment where there is a less
intrusive means to get at the evidence.
The Zurcher majority rejected this claim as well, for two reasons.
First, the Court found· that it would be impractical to require law
enforcement to prove the necessity for choosing a search warrant rather
than a subpoena. Searches often occur at early stages of investigations
before all suspects are identified. The majority wrote,
The seemingly blameless third party in possession of ... evidence
may not be innocent at all; and if he is, he may nevertheless be so
related to or so sympathetic with the culpable that he cannot be
relied upon to retain and preserve the articles that may implicate
his friends ....37
Second, the Court believed that the practicalities of investigating
crime would lead prosecutors and police to avoid using search warrants
unless they were necessary. "[S]earch warrants are more difficult to
obtain than subpoenas," the Court noted.
Where, in the real world, subpoenas would suffice, it can be
expected that they will be employed· by the rational prosecutor.
On the other hand, when . . . the prosecutor chooses to use the
search warrant, it is unlikely that he has needlessly selected the
more difficult course. 38
In effect, the Court left the choice of tactics-search warrant vs.
subpoena-to the discretion of the prosecutor, trusting in the
practicalities of the "real world" to limit abuses.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556.
Id. at 555.
See id. at 560-561.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 563.
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(3) Searches Directed at the Press-The Stanford Daily's third
contention went directly to the First Amendment interests at stake when
police are allowed to raid a newspaper office. 39 The search of a
newspaper office can disrupt or delay the publication of news. Seizure
of information that has not yet been published can amount to a "prior
restraint" on constitutionally protected speech. Search of a news
organization can threaten the confidentiality of news sources and
thereby limit access of reporters to critical information. And-as the
American colonists saw in their struggles with George III40-searches
directed at the press can chill a news organization's willingness to gather
and report news unfavorable to the same government that chooses where
to search and whom to arrest. For all of these reasons, the Daily argued,
whatever the Fourth Amendment might allow as "reasonable" under
ordinary circumstances, the rules should be different where a search
threatens to chill First Amendment interests. Search of a news media
office should be allowed only in those rare circumstances where the
police can demonstrate that important evidence will be removed or
destroyed if law enforcement tries to obtain it by subpoena. 41 In other
words, the Daily sought a per se rule that magistrates should not issue
warrants to search newspapers without first finding that the search was
the only means for obtaining the evidence.
The Zurcher majority was unwilling to impose that per se rule of
necessity. Instead, the Court suggested, magistrates could protect First
Amendment interests through their application of traditional Fourth
Amendment standards:
Properly administered, the preconditions for a warrant-probable
cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, and overall reasonableness-should afford
sufficient protection against the harms ·that are assertedly
threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices.42
III.

BEYOND PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCOUNTING FOR FIRST AMENDMENT
VALUES IN SEARCHES TARGETING RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

The Zurcher opinion stirred controversy as soon as it was issued.
In short order, Congress took the unusual step of passing legislation to
39. See id. at 563-564.
40. In Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 724-728 (1961), the Supreme Court
detailed the historical genesis of the Fourth Amendment in struggles between the press and the
British crown.
41. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 563-564.
42. Id. at 565.
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limit its reach. 43 Nevertheless, as a matter of constitutional law, Zurcher
remains the standard for evaluating search warrants that implicate First
Amendment interests.
In several respects, Zurcher seems to validate the government's
tactics in the March 2002 searches. Just like the police in Zurcher, the
Operation Green Quest agents acted under the authority of a search
warrant issued by a magistrate who found probable cause to believe
there was evidence of crime in the offices to be searched. Under
Zurcher, it does not matter that the people and institutions searched were
not charged, or perhaps even suspected, of criminal acts themselves.
Likewise under Zurcher, it seems not to matter whether an unannounced
search was necessary or whether a subpoena may have sufficed to get
the government what it needed. Finally, under Zurcher, the fact that the
searches targeted religious institutions does not fundamentally alter the
traditional Fourth Amendment approach to search and seizure. As a
general rule, the government satisfies its constitutional obligations when
it obtains a search warrant and acts within the authority of the warrant.
Still, searching a church, or temple, or mosque is different than
searching a suspected drug dealer's apartment. The privacy of innocent
believers and the potential for chilling religious expression make it
different. Zurcher does not say that probable cause alone is sufficient to
permit any search of any institution without regard to the First
Amendment interests at stake. Even as it denied relief to the Stanford
Daily, the Zurcher Court acknowledged the historical link between First
Amendment interests and the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment:
It is true that the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment
emerged "is largely a history of conflict between the Crown and
the press," and that in issuing warrants and determining the
reasonableness of a search, ... magistrates should be aware that
"unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an
instrument for stifling liberty of expression. "44
Accordingly, the Court continued, First Amendment concerns play a key
role in limiting the government's power to search: "Where the materials
sought to be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the

43. In 1980, Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, in response to
Zurcher. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report states, "The Committee believes that the search
warrant procedure in itself does not sufficiently protect the press and other innocent third parties
.... " Sen. Judiciary Comm. Rep. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1980, at 3951.
44. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965) and
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961)).
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requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with scrupulous
exactitude."45 Those words should apply to the search of the Fiqh
Council or the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences no less
than to a search at a student newspaper.
The basic Fourth Amendment requirements are (1) probable cause
and particularity, and (2) in the words of the Zurcher Court, "overall
reasonableness." The hard part, of course, is deciding what it means to
be "scrupulous" and "exacting" in applying those requirements in a
search targeting religious institutions.
A.

Probable Cause and Particularity in Searches for Evidence of
"Material Support"

The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.''46 Those words found
their way into the Bill of Rights in large measure because of conflicts
between the press and the Crown in England and Colonial America.
Officers armed with "general" warrants could enter press offices and
search for anything they might consider "seditious" or "scandalous.''47
Searching, even without arrest or prosecution, was an effective way to
identify political dissidents and to chill their desire to write or speak out
against the king. And an effective way to silence a printing press was to
seize what it printed, not to mention the press itself.
The Fourth Amendment requirements of probable cause and
particularity work hand-in-hand to prohibit that kind of general search.
Before police can search, they must show probable cause that a premises
holds evidence of a crime.
And-to satisfy the particularity
requirement-they must articulate specifically what that evidence is. In
addition, the particularity clause limits what police can do after they get
the warrant. They can search only in the particular place, and for the
particular thing, that the warrant identifies. 48 They cannot look for a
stolen twenty-seven inch television in a six by ten inch glove
compartment. And when they find what is listed in the warrant, they
must stop searching.

45. Id. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
46. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
47. See Marcus v. Search Warrant; 367 U.S. 717, 726 (1961).
48. For cases detailing the limits imposed on police searches by the "particularity''
requirement, see generally Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 90 Geo. L.J. 11171124 (2002) [hereinafter Criminal Procedure Project].
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The particularity requirement plays an especially critical role in
protecting First Amendment interests.49 As the March 2002 searches
demonstrate, the more broadly agents are allowed to search, the more
likely they are to disrupt teaching, speaking, writing and publication.
The more drafts, notes, emails and private papers they are allowed to see
and to seize, the more the drafters, note-takers, emailers and paperwriters will stop writing and communicating in the future. A limited
search, in a particular place for a particular piece of evidence, is less
likely to chill protected religious expression.
Particularity is not a difficult concept to grasp in a search for a
stolen twenty-seven inch television. But it is immensely complicated
when it comes to seeking evidence of "material support" for terrorist
organizations. 50 A search within a religious or educational institution for
evidence of "material support" can stretch the concept of particularity to
an astonishing breadth for several reasons.
First, a search for "material support" aims at documents. By their
nature, search warrants for documents lead to broad, highly intrusive
searches, because they allow agents to look everywhere the relevant
documents may be found. Often, that means every file in an officeincluding computer files. And, because an agent cannot know what a
document says until she reads it, even an agent searching for a specific
document may be required to read through dozens or thousands of
private papers before finding what she seeks. 51 Moreover, unlike the
search for a stolen television, which is over when the television is
seized, most document searches have no logical stopping point. A
search for "all documents referring to terrorists" allows agents to keep
looking until they review all documents, regardless of how many they
may seize along the way.
Second, the crime of "material support" brings into play an almost
limitless range of potential "evidence" subject to review and seizure.
49. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-486 (1965); and see Criminal Procedure
Project, supra n. 48, at 1120-1121.
50. A federal statute makes it a felony "knowingly" to provide "material support or resources
to a foreign terrorist organization." 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l) (2000). "Material support" includes
any form of financial support as well as personnel or equipment. Id. § 2339A(b). The definition
of "material support" was expanded by the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-156, §
805(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 377 (Oct. 26, 2001), to include intangibles such as "expert advice or
assistance" along with the "training" that was already· considered "material support'' in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(b). Significantly, the statute explicitly excludes "religious materials" as a form of
material support. Id.
51. "[I]n order to find a particular document, no matter how specifically it is identified in the
warrant, the police will have to search every place where it may be-including, presumably, every
file in the office-and to examine each document they find to see ifit is the correct one." Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 573 n. 7 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Evidence of material support includes a great deal more than just
financial records. The statute prohibits "knowingly'' providing support
to a terrorist organization. 52 Documents that might show "knowledge"
of the sources and uses of charitable donations therefore become
potential evidence of crime. But this may be only the beginning of the
particularity explosion. A thorough investigator would tell us that
evidence of motive could be critical to proof of any crime. And why
might a suspect person or institution support terrorism? To answer that
question, a searching agent might say, she needs to know more about the
suspect's knowledge of terrorists and their aims; she may even need to
understand the suspect's political and religious views. An agent
concerned with material support to Hamas, for example, may need to
probe a suspect's writings about Palestine, or the suspect's readings
about martyrdom. All of these writings may be evidence of a motive to
provide material support to terrorism.
If this concept of "particularity" sounds farfetched, one need only
look at the March 2002 search warrants to see how real it is. Among
many other things, those warrants authorized agents to search for and
seize "any and all information referencing in any way . . . any ...
individual or entity designated as a terrorist by the President."53 At an
Islamic University or religious council, that description would include
virtually any book, sermon, scholarly treatise or private letter expressing
religious or political views on the most important issues of the day for
many American Muslims, including publications that condemn terrorist
acts.
A warrant of such breadth raises two, related concerns. One, of
course, is that the .agents will do what they apparently did when they
seized five hundred boxes of paper in March 2002. They will seize
everything that falls within the warrant's description. Never mind that
such a description includes-literally-every issue of the Washington
Post published since September 11, 2001. The "seize everything"
approach is what shuts down an institution. The March 2002 searchers
didn't take copies of data files. They took all of the computers. 54
A second, but equally serious concern is that a warrant like those
issued in March 2002 is so broad that agents will have to narrow it
themselves as they choose what to seize. In searching through all
information "referencing any entity designated as a terrorist," for
example, a selective agent might seize only those papers and books that,
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l).
53. See ACLU Brief, supra n. 7, at 3.
54. See Masters, supra n. 9, at A13.
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in her view, showed sympathy for terrorists. But that kind of approach
may be even more troubling. We may as well ask federal agents to look
inside a religious institution and see whose views they find most
troubling.
Granted, it may be impossible for investigators, at the time they
apply for a warrant, to identify each of the particular documents they
expect to seize as evidence of material support for terrorism. The nature
and potential scope of that kind of crime is simply too complex.
Granted, where such material support is real and such documents exist,
the need for law enforcement to find them is substantial. But neither the
"seize everything" approach, nor the "I'll know it when I see it"
approach, adequately protects the First Amendment interests at stake in
a search of religious institutions. Even the Zurcher Court recognized
that the threat to First Amendment values is greatest where government
agents are allowed to rummage through and make their own judgments
about the incriminating nature of books and papers. Invoking an earlier
decision that had invalidated a warrant authorizing a search for materials
"relating to the Communist Party," the Zurcher Court concluded,
"Where presumptively protected materials are sought to be seized, the
warrant requirement should be administered to leave as little as possible
to the discretion or whim of the officer in the field." 55
There is precedent for a more "exacting" approach to probable
cause and particularity when constitutionally protected materials are
subject to search. In obscenity cases, the Court has required "rigorous
procedural safeguards" beyond the normal Fourth Amendment
requirements. 56 Where large-scale seizures threaten to keep materials
out of publication, the Court has required adversary hearings before or
immediately after seizure to determine what is and what isn't
"c:ibscene."57 Even where seizures do not threaten a prior restraint on
publication of allegedly obscene materials, the Court has urged
magistrates to "focus searchingly on the question of obscenity" in
determining probable cause. 58
No doubt a procedure requiring judicial review at or near the time
of search would prove difficult and time consuming in major cases. But
there are practical ways to administer such a process. 59 And the very
55. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564.
56. Ft. Wayne Books, Inc. v. Ind., 489 U.S. 46, 62 (1989); and see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. NY.,
442 U.S. 319, 326 n.5 (1979) (noting that First Amendment imposes special constraints on
searches and seizures directed at materials intended for publication).
57. See A Quantity of Copies ofBooks v. Kan., 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
58. Id. at 210 (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)).
59. Courts administer discovery disputes in major civil cases on a daily basis. Much the same
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prospect of quick and exacting judicial review would deter the kind of
large-scale seizures witnessed in March 2002. If our Constitution gives
that kind of protection to allegedly obscene books and videos, then
surely it must accord at least the equivalent to religious texts.
B.

Assessing "Reasonableness" when the Government's Aim is to
Disrupt

The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. One might argue that it is unreasonable to seek evidence from
a religious institution under a search warrant when the same evidence
might be obtained more easily, and with less disruption to religious
expression, by serving a subpoena or simply asking for the evidence.
But, as we have seen, the Zurcher Court dismissed that argument, in part
because the Court believed the practicalities .of the "real world" would
take care of the problem. 60 In the Court's view, rational and practicalminded prosecutors would not choose the tactic of a search warrant
where they really believed that other, less disruptive means would
suffice. 61 Who would do it the hard way, the Court assumed, when they
could do it an easier way?
Unfortunately, the post-September 11 world has turned that
rationale on its head. The present, publicly-articulated focus of federal
law enforcement is on prevention of future terrorist acts and disruption
of terrorist networks. 62 Prosecution of past crimes, though not ignored
by any means, is now a secondary priority. This change of focus has
brought with it a significant change in tactics. Increasingly, the
government has come to regard the traditional tactics of criminal
investigation-searches, arrests, temporary detention of suspects-as
goals in themselves rather than as means toward the end of successful
prosecution. 63 The March 2002 searches may be an example of that
kind of process would be involved in separating genuinely useful evidence from protected
expressive materials with little or no value to an investigation.
60. See supra, text accompanying nn. 37-38.
61. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 562-563.
62. Soon after September 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft asserted the he would employ
all lawful means to target and detain suspected terrorists in order to prevent another attack. See
John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors Conference (Oct. 25, 2001), available at
<http:llwww.usdoj.gov!aglspeeches/2001lagcrisisremarks10_25.htm> (accessed Jan. 5, 2004)
(cited in David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38
Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. I, 24 n. 98 (2003)); and see Worldwide Threats to
Intelligence Community: Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. ll,
2003, at I (statement of Robert S. Mueller, Director of the F.B.I.) [hereinafter Mueller Statement]
("The prevention of another terrorist attack remains the FBI's top priority.").
63. The impact of that change of tactics on American Muslims has been pronounced.
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change in tactical choices. Only two days after the searches, the
Washington Post reported, "Government officials said that even if no
crimes are proven, it might serve the counter terrorist cause to simply
disrupt the flow of money."64 This post-9/11 "real world" is obviously
different than the one the Court saw in Zurcher. In the Zurcher world, a
rational prosecutor would not choose a disruptive tactic like a wellpublicized search warrant where a quieter, less intrusive approach would
work. In today's world, the highest officials in our government may
prefer the use of a search warrant precisely because it stands the best
chance for disrupting a suspect institution. 65
The Zurcher Court found no need for a magistrate to consider the
necessity for a warrant, because the normal priorities of prosecutors
would prevent abuses. But now, those priorities have changed. And the
level of judicial supervision should change as well. Where a search
seems likely to disrupt the work of a religious institution-indeed,
where it may be intended to do exactly that-it is not too much to ask
investigators to convince a magistrate that the search is necessary. It is
not too much to ask investigators to demonstrate to a magistrate-before
they get the warrant-the steps they intend to take to minimize its
disruptive impact on protected religious expression. We require that
kind of showing in other contexts-in the issuance of Title III wiretap
authorizations, for example. 66 There is no practical reason why we
cannot require it for a search warrant.
Moreover, as the March 2002 searches demonstrate, the
government's tactics in the war on terror call for increased judicial
supervision after the warrant is issued. When ongoing religious
teaching, speaking and writing are disrupted, courts should demand that
Muslims are by far the most typical targets of "preventive" detentions and searches. For critiques
of those tactics and further discussion of their impact on American Muslims, see generally David
Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 Emory L. J. 1003
(2002); Eric L. Muller, 1217 and 9111: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. Va. L.
Rev. 571 (2002); and Scott Alexander, Inalienable Rights Question: Muslims in the U.S. Since
September 11'\ 7 J. Islamic L. & Culture 103 (2002).
·
64. Mintz & Jackman, supra n. 2, at Al; and cf Mueller Statement, supra n. 63, at 2 ("Our
investigations have also made it more difficult for suspicious NGOs to raise money and continue
their operations.").
65. The March 2002 searches obviously had approvals from the highest levels of federal law
enforcement. They involved the coordination of numerous federal agencies and the participation
of 150 federal agents. See Dunne, supra n. 2, at 10.
66. Before issuing an order authorizing a Title ill wiretap, a federal judge must find that other
investigative measures have been tried and have failed or that such measures appear unlikely to
succeed. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2000)). In executing a Title III order, agents must demonstrate
reasonable efforts to minimize intrusion on conversations not germane to the investigation. 18
u.s.c. § 2518(5) (2000).
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the government at least minimize the period of disruption. One way to
accomplish that, as we have already seen, is to apply the particularity
requirement in a more exacting fashion. It takes less time to go through
one hundred boxes than five hundred. Another way is to demand more
accountability in the process of reviewing seized items. In the case of
some of the targeted institutions, for example, computers were seized
and held for weeks, even though the copying of computer files could
have been done in a few days. 67
Courts can, and should, play a role in minimizing other kinds of
damage. The March 2002 searches dealt severe blows to the reputations
of the targeted institutions, blows that had both short and long-term
effects on enrollment and public support. In part, that kind of ripple
effect is inevitable from a search by law enforcement. But it can be
minimized by the kinds of public statements made, or not made, by the
government. In the March 2002 searches, government tactics seemed
calculated to maximize, rather than to avoid, damage to the reputations
of the targeted institutions. While officially claiming secrecy for its
investigation, the government's media contacts made certain that the
papers trumpeted Operation Green Quest and its accomplishments in
disrupting terror. The implied public warning was clear, as the
government apparently intended it to be.
In other contexts involving the execution of search warrants, courts
have condemned government use of news media where it unnecessarily
intrudes on privacy or causes damage to reputation. 68 Those same courts
need not become tools of a one-sided public relations campaign that
allows the government to publicly condemn religious institutions as
supporters of terrorism while simultaneously telling us that its reasons
are too secret for the public to know. Sealed search warrants and
selective government news leaks are incompatible.
CONCLUSION

The March 2002 searches caused significant, and predictable,
damage to religious institutions. It is not enough to say that the searches
were based on warrants supported by probable cause. The concept of
"material support" for terrorism is so broad that the traditional
protections of probable cause and particularity are severely watered

67. See Bradley, supra n. 14, at BS.
68. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 604 (1999) (finding that officers violate the Fourth
Amendment by inviting members of news media to accompany them as they execute warrants in a
private home).
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down when evidence· of material support is the object of a search.
Moreover, when the government chooses to use a well-publicized search
for the purpose of disrupting the operations of a religious institution
rather than purely as a tool of criminal investigation, then the potential
for abuse of the warrant process is immense. The Supreme Court has
called upon federal magistrates to supervise government searches with
"scrupulous exactitude"69 when freedom of expression is at stake. In a
nation founded on respect for religious liberty, we should expect nothing
less.

69. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 319 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).

